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Professor David Pozen has written an absolutely stellar account of 
the uses, meanings, and regulations of leaks of secret information by 
government officials.  At the most general level, Pozen argues that the 
United States’s apparently chaotic system of leak regulation — draco-
nian penalties that are almost never imposed; threats to punish leakers 
but not publishers — masks a deeper logic.  This system, “although 
ritualistically condemned by those in power, has served a wide variety 
of governmental ends at the same time as it has efficiently kept most 
disclosures within tolerable bounds.”1  Pozen’s nuanced and subtle ac-
count of what those governmental ends are and how they are served 
by the existing regulatory regime is both wholly persuasive and deeply 
insightful. 
The word “governmental,” however, covers quite a bit of ground 
and might usefully be deconstructed.  As Pozen’s account makes clear, 
the broad ends that are served by the leak regime are most decidedly 
those of the President and other executive branch officials.  Indeed, 
Pozen notes the pervasive sense among such officials that they “own” 
the secrets that they produce and control.2  Various executive branch 
officials collect and develop that information, classify that information 
as secret, and then, as Pozen so deftly demonstrates, selectively leak 
the “secret” information that furthers their agendas.  This bare-bones 
summary of Pozen’s positive account suffices to make one key point 
pellucidly clear: “secret” is a political category, not a natural one.  
Facts in isolation do not cry out for secrecy; facts within a specific po-
litical context do.3 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  Thanks to Dave Pozen, Aziz Rana, Catherine 
Roach, and Mariah Zeisberg for helpful and thought-provoking comments on earlier drafts.  Any 
remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own. 
 1 David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Un-
lawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 517 (2013). 
 2 Id. at 603 & n.410. 
 3 In this regard, it is helpful to think in terms of what Professor Mariah Zeisberg has called 
“security orders” — political constructs that “specif[y] and enact[] the content of a national securi-
ty interest; what will be construed as threats to that interest; and a supportive construction of 
constitutional war authority.”  MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CON-
STITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 95 (2013).  To the extent that a certain piece of information “must 
be” secret for national security reasons, that imperative arises only in the context of, and with re-
spect to the terms of, a particular security order.  See also Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 
44 CONN. L. REV. 1417, 1451–90 (2012) (tracing the twentieth-century rise of a security order 
emphasizing executive expertise). 
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If this observation at first seems too obvious to justify the expendi-
ture of pixels, consider that it is emphatically not the way that we tend 
to talk about government secrets.  The fact that someone in the execu-
tive branch has chosen to mark some piece of information as “secret” 
sets the presumptive terms for how that information may properly be 
used, shared, and disclosed.  As Pozen notes, “virtually any deliberate 
leak of classified information to an unauthorized recipient is likely to 
fall within the reach of one or more criminal statutes,”4 and “[n]o court 
has ever accepted a defense of improper classification.”5  In other 
words, executive branch officials determine what information is secret, 
a determination to which other political actors are expected to (and do) 
defer.  Executive branch officials frequently leak “secret” information 
without adverse consequence, because a permissive regime for such 
leaks broadly serves executive branch purposes.  But when infor-
mation is leaked outside of the normal, executive-friendly parameters 
of this regime, the executive reserves the right to prosecute, with the 
possibility of severe punishment.  Secrets are treated as belonging to 
the executive; little wonder, then, that “there are substantially more 
unattributed disclosures ‘for’ the President than ‘against’ him.”6 
One can certainly understand why Presidents and other high-
ranking executive branch officials find this regime generally appealing.  
But what’s in it for the rest of us?  Unless we can think of some good 
reason to believe that, when it comes to secret-keeping and secret-
spilling, what’s good for the President is good for America, we should 
be thinking about ways of reframing this secrecy regime.  As Pozen 
suggests, it does produce some public goods,7 and we should be careful 
not to sacrifice them.  At the same time, if it tends to produce public 
benefits largely when they coincide with benefits to the executive, then 
those benefits are destined to remain partial (in both senses of the 
word).  By way of correction, I propose that we take more seriously 
the idea that these are our collective secrets as a political community, 
rather than the executive branch’s secrets. 
Of course, the fact that they are, in some sense, “our” secrets does 
not mean that we can all know them.  That would undermine the very 
concept of secrecy.  But it turns out that there is another institution, 
chosen by the people and responsive to them, tasked with making reg-
ular decisions on their behalf.  It is time that we began thinking seri-
ously about the role of Congress in our secrecy regime, a role that is 
given constitutional sanction by the Speech or Debate Clause, which 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Pozen, supra note 1, at 524–25.  
 5 Id. at 523.  
 6 Id. at 570.  
 7 These are discussed primarily in Part IV of the piece.  See id. at 605–33.   
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allows members to speak freely, without fear of punishment by the ex-
ecutive or the courts.8 
The shining example of this use of congressional power, which I 
have discussed in some detail elsewhere,9 is Mike Gravel, the first-term 
Senator from Alaska who, in 1971, used his exalted perch as chair of 
the Buildings and Grounds Subcommittee of the Environment and 
Public Works Committee to hold a late-night hearing at which he re-
leased over four thousand pages of the Pentagon Papers into the public 
record.  Senator Gravel’s act has been largely eclipsed by the Supreme 
Court’s ruling the next day in New York Times Co. v. United States10 
(The Pentagon Papers Case), which lifted an injunction on publishing 
the Papers in the press.  But had the timing been different, or the 
Court majority been more hospitable to the Nixon Administration’s 
claims (there were, after all, three dissenters in the Pentagon Papers 
Case11), we might well remember Senator Gravel as the hero in that 
episode.  Indeed, the Court’s ruling left open the possibility of post-
publication criminal prosecution of press outlets,12 and Senator Gravel, 
concluding that fear of such prosecution led to timidity on the part of 
the newspapers, arranged for a version of the Papers to be published 
in book form.13  We may remember the Pentagon Papers incident as a 
story about the heroism of the courts and the press, but Senator Gravel 
released more of the Papers, and he did it earlier.14 
Nor is Senator Gravel the only member to have made use of his 
Speech or Debate Clause protections to release theretofore secret in-
formation.  Professor Kathleen Clark has described a number of such 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and 
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”).  For more on the clause, including 
its history, see generally JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE 
PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 
87–110 (2007).  
 9 See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 745–50 (2012).  
 10 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
 11 Id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 752 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 759 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting).  
 12 Justices Stewart and White explicitly held open the possibility of post-publication criminal 
punishment.  See id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 733, 740 (White, J., concurring).  Com-
bined with the three dissenters, they made a majority that was at least open to punishing the leak.  
 13 See Chafetz, supra note 9, at 747–49.  For the comparative scope of the different published 
versions of the Papers, see id. at 745 n.160.  
 14 This makes the Court’s subsequent holding that Gravel’s decision to arrange for private 
publication of the Papers was outside the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause all the more un-
fortunate.  Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 622–27 (1972).  I’ve criticized that decision else-
where.  See CHAFETZ, supra note 8, at 99–100; Chafetz, supra note 9, at 748–49; see also Sam J. 
Ervin, Jr., The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. 
REV. 175, 184–88 (1973). 
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disclosures in the national security context,15 including everything 
from Representative Michael Harrington’s 1974 leak of information 
about American efforts to overthrow Chilean President Salvador  
Allende,16 to releases by the Pike and Church Committees over the ob-
jections of the Ford Administration,17 to Representative Robert  
Torricelli’s 1995 release of information regarding the role of the CIA in 
murders in Guatemala.18  Indeed, in the case of the Harrington release, 
the House Ethics Committee chose not to impose any internal disci-
pline, “finding that the information had not been properly classified”19 
— a conclusion that, as noted above, no court has ever reached.  Out-
side of the national security context, Representative Darrell Issa in 
2012 used his Speech or Debate Clause immunity to enter into the 
Congressional Record a letter that disclosed the contents of a sealed 
wiretap application as part of the congressional investigation into the 
“Operation Fast and Furious” gun-smuggling operation.20 
In the national security context, the most recent additions to this 
list are Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, both of whom are 
members of the Intelligence Committee.  During the 2011 debates over 
reauthorizing portions of the PATRIOT Act, they announced on the 
Senate floor that the Obama Administration had adopted a secret, im-
plausible interpretation of portions of the Act dealing with domestic 
surveillance, although they did not release the details of this secret in-
terpretation.21  In doing so, they took what Pozen has termed “deep se-
crets” — that is, secrets that we did not even know existed — and 
made them shallower.22  One might think, however, that they should 
have gone further, that they should have made public the content of 
those decisions as well.23  And when it came to light that the NSA was 
engaged in a massive program of domestic surveillance, Professor 
Bruce Ackerman urged the Senators to reveal information they had 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
915, 940–46.  
 16 Id. at 942.  
 17 Id. at 943.  
 18 Id. at 945–46.  
 19 Id. at 943.  
 20 See Jonathan Strong & Amanda Becker, Moving on From Contempt Vote, or Not, ROLL 
CALL, July 12, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 14553858. 
 21 See Chafetz, supra note 9, at 750–51.  
 22 See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010).  
 23 See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1724–30 (2011) 
(book review) (arguing that the work of the Office of Legal Counsel should be disclosed); Sudha 
Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the 
Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 601–29 (2009) (same). 
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learned in closed briefings, in the interest of having an informed de-
bate on legislative responses to the surveillance program.24 
As the examples adduced so far demonstrate, members of Congress 
have a range of options available to them when dealing with “secret” 
information.  They can simply accede to executive branch demands for 
secrecy; they can make the secret shallower by disclosing its existence 
but not its content; and they can release varying amounts of the actual 
content.  Which of these is appropriate will, of course, be highly situa-
tion dependent.  But given the extent to which executive branch secre-
cy determinations are made to advance executive branch interests, 
there is no reason for Congress to offer automatic deference to those 
determinations. 
Of course, there are rules about such things — the Speech or De-
bate Clause prevents punishment of members in any other place, but 
the Constitution explicitly reserves to each house the right to discipline 
its members.25  The rules of the Senate Intelligence Committee create 
an elaborate procedure26 for disclosing classified information, requiring 
a committee vote, notification of the Majority and Minority Leaders, 
and then notification of the President.  If the President objects, then 
disclosure requires a vote of the full Senate in closed session.  Any 
committee member can set the procedure in motion by requesting a 
vote, and the rules require the committee to hold a vote within five 
days when such a request has been made.  If the committee votes to 
disclose and the President objects, either the Majority and Minority 
Leaders jointly or a majority of the Committee suffices to bring the 
matter to the Senate floor in closed session; once the matter is brought 
to the floor, debate is governed by a tight timeline, and the issue can-
not be filibustered.  Release of information outside of these procedures 
must be investigated by the Ethics Committee; if it determines that 
there has been a significant breach of confidentiality, then it must rec-
ommend a punishment to the full Senate.  The House has similar pro-
cedures for its Intelligence Committee.27 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Bruce Ackerman, Breach or Debate, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www 
.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/1/breach_or_debate_congress_snowden_prism.  
 25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  On the houses’ disciplinary power generally, see CHAFETZ, 
supra note 8, at 207–35.  See also Chafetz, supra note 9, at 754 (noting that the Speech or Debate 
Clause “must be read in pari materia” with each house’s disciplinary authority). 
 26 This procedure is laid out in S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. § 8 (1976) (last amended 2007), reprint-
ed as amended in S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG., RULES OF PROCE-
DURE, 10, 14–16 (Comm. Print 2011); see also S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH 
CONG., supra, r. 9.7–.8, at 6 (incorporating the procedures of S. Res. 400, as amended, into the 
standing rules of the Committee). 
 27 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. X, cl. 11(f)–(g), reprinted in H.R. 
DOC. NO. 112-161, at 535–40 (2013). 
  
2013] WHOSE SECRETS? 91 
 
It is not clear whether either Senator Wyden or Senator Udall has 
attempted to invoke these procedures — as Michael Stern has noted, it 
is possible that the Committee interprets its own rules so as to prevent 
disclosure of an attempt to invoke the disclosure procedures.28  If that 
is the case, it is deeply unfortunate — the secrecy should, at the very 
least, be made shallower by disclosing to the public that there is ongo-
ing debate about releasing information.  This would alert the public 
that there is something of consequence being withheld, and members 
would have to face questions about how they voted on the disclosure 
issue and why.  And if Senators Wyden and Udall have not attempted 
to invoke the disclosure procedures, then an explanation should be 
demanded of them.  They obviously believe that disturbing infor-
mation is being withheld, and they obviously are frustrated — a frus-
tration that appears to be shared by members of both parties and both 
houses — by what they see as a pattern of lies from the executive 
branch.29  Where is the Gravelian spirit? 
Of course, there will be the usual litany of objections.  At some 
point, truly damaging information will be disclosed, either by a vindic-
tive chamber or by a member releasing information on his own.  Per-
haps.  But it is not at all clear why we would think that Congress is 
especially prone to this.  Senator Gravel, after all, released only about 
4100 of the Pentagon Papers’ 7800 total pages, and he excised various 
names from the pages he did release.30  By contrast, the two major in-
discriminate disclosures in recent history — those by Chelsea Manning 
and Edward Snowden — have come from people with executive 
branch ties.  Indeed, it is at least possible that, if members of Congress 
were more willing to evaluate and consider releasing classified infor-
mation, future Mannings and Snowdens might be willing to leak to 
them rather than engaging in indiscriminate public releases.31  In that 
case, at least the final decision on releasing information to the public 
would be made by a democratically accountable official, who would be 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 See Michael Stern, Congressional Release of Classified Information and the Speech or De-
bate Clause, POINT OF ORDER (Aug. 6, 2013, 9:27 AM), http://www.pointoforder.com/2013/08/06 
/congressional-release-of-classified-information-and-the-speech-or-debate-clause/.  
 29 See Jeremy Herb, Intelligence Chief Clapper Apologizes for ‘Erroneous’ Statement to Con-
gress, THE HILL, July 3, 2013, at 3; Ron Wyden, Mark Udall & Martin Heinrich, End the N.S.A. 
Dragnet, Now, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013, at A25.  
 30 See Chafetz, supra note 9, at 751.  
 31 Indeed, Daniel Ellsberg initially approached Senators Fulbright, McGovern, and Mathias 
with the Pentagon Papers, hoping that they would hold hearings on them.  Although those Sena-
tors were initially supportive, their eventual “cold feet” led Ellsberg to approach the press.  He 
subsequently learned that Senator Gravel shared his anti-war leanings, and approached him.  
Ellsberg insists that, from the beginning, he preferred legislative hearings to release to the news-
papers.  See Daniel Ellsberg, Foreword to MIKE GRAVEL & JOE LAURIA, A POLITICAL ODYS-
SEY 9, 9–10 (2008). 
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likely to exercise at least some measure of care — as Senator Gravel 
did — to avoid releasing especially damaging information. 
More importantly, perhaps, the question of what disclosures count 
as damaging depends, as noted above, on a politically constructed un-
derstanding of our national security interests.  A regime that, as Pozen 
documents, tolerates and even encourages widespread leaking by exec-
utive branch officials to advance their agendas, but tells terrifying  
tales about the consequences of disclosures by members of Congress 
pursuing their agendas, will inevitably give the executive branch an 
outsized role in constructing those national security interests.  I, for 
one, can think of no a priori reason to prefer the national security vi-
sions of the Scooter Libbys and James Clappers of the world to those 
of the Ron Wydens and Mark Udalls. 
The skeptics will, however, suggest that the real threat is executive 
backlash.  If Congress discloses information that the executive does 
not want disclosed, then the executive will simply stop giving Congress 
information.  Again, perhaps.  But Congress has ways of making the 
executive talk, ranging from contempt citations32 to funding cut-offs33 
to refusing to pass legislation that the executive branch wants.34  The 
point is not that Congress should release everything (it shouldn’t!), nor 
that it should always get its way over the President.  The point is 
simply that secrecy determinations are matters for interbranch politics 
like any other.  We do ourselves a serious disservice when we allow the 
executive branch to claim exclusive ownership over this part of the po-
litical commons. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 See generally Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1083 (2009).  
 33 See generally Chafetz, supra note 9, at 725–35.  
 34 See Ackerman, supra note 24 (“If administration officials refuse to testify at secret sessions 
in the future, they will most likely alienate the fence-sitters [on a vote to shut down the NSA wire-
tapping program].  A boycott would also doom the renewal of the Patriot Act when it comes up 
for reconsideration in 2015.”). 
